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Arrogance, Anger and Debate 
 
Forthcoming in Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social 
Sciences, Special issue on Skeptical Problems in Political Epistemology, edited by Scott Aikin 
and Tempest Henning. 




Abstract: Arrogance has widespread negative consequences for epistemic practices. 
Arrogant people tend to intimidate and humiliate other agents, and to ignore or dismiss 
their views. They have a propensity to mansplain. They are also angry. In this paper I explain 
why anger is a common manifestation of arrogance in order to understand the effects of 
arrogance on debate. I argue that superbia (which is the kind of arrogance that is my 
concern here) is a vice of superiority characterised by an overwhelming desire to diminish 
other people in order to excel and by a tendency to arrogate special entitlements for 
oneself, iŶĐludiŶg the pƌiǀilege of Ŷot haǀiŶg to justifǇ oŶe͛s Đlaiŵs. 
 
 
Arrogance, including intellectual arrogance, can take different forms. One kind of arrogance 
finds its expression in hubristic forms of hyper-autonomy. It is characterised by aloofness, 
and feelings of invulnerability which lead to irresponsible attitudes to risk. The behaviour of 
some investment managers prior to the 2008 financial crisis illustrates this form of hubristic 
arrogance. There is, however, a different cluster of attitudes and dispositions which are 
usually perceived as arrogant. These include smugness, self-importance, self-satisfaction 
and a thin skin. Individuals exhibiting these features tend to put other people down; they 
are bullies who shout, intimidate and humiliate others. They may also condescend and 
belittle. A paradigmatic example of this kind of person is the powerful individual who 
dominates discussions, reacts angrily when criticised, and rudely interrupts other people 
when they are speaking. He (and it is ŵost ofteŶ a ͞he͟) also adopts a ǀaƌietǇ of iŶtiŵidatiŶg 




We have all come across individuals of this kind. They are arrogant, domineering and 
always a small step away from anger.1 Cultural norms discouraging public displays of anger 
may serve to inhibit some of these behaviours. In these contexts they are often substituted 
by expressions of condescension or contempt. In the United Kingdom in particular, where 
expressions of anger or rage are especially disapproved because they indicate a lack of self-
control, the dominant elite often responds to challenges with a condescending laugh which 
may hide suppressed anger. For example both the current foreign secretary Boris Johnson 
and the minister for Brexit David Davis often laugh in response to questions from the media 
before answering in a jokey manner. 
Given the existence of this positive correlation between some forms of arrogance 
and anger, it is natural to wonder why this may be the case. One aim of this paper is to 
answer this question which has not, to my knowledge, been addressed in the philosophical 
literature. One reason for the neglect is that philosophical accounts of anger are often based 
on the analysis of this emotion offered by Aristotle in the Rhetoric (Aristotle, 2007), while 
interpreting the latter as suggesting that narcissism is the primary cause of excessive anger. 
Narcissism and arrogance are, of course, closely related since people who suffer from one 
trait may also possess the other. Nevertheless, narcissism and arrogance are distinct. It is 
my contention here that anger is properly understood as a manifestation of the kind of 
arrogance I call superbia, whilst narcissism is more closely associated with envy. It is possible 
for envy to slide into anger. Nevertheless, these are distinct emotions. 
Exploring the connection of anger to superbia throws light on the complex nature of 
this vice of superiority. It is expressed by an overwhelming desire to diminish or humiliate 
otheƌ people iŶ oƌdeƌ to ďe ďetteƌ thaŶ theǇ aƌe, aŶd thus eǆĐel iŶ oŶe͛s oǁŶ eǇes.2 It is also 
characterised by a propensity to arrogate entitlements to special treatment of the kind that 
one denies to other people. I argue that this form of arrogance is ultimately borne of 
insecurity. Given that anger is the response to an act that is perceived as a wrong 
threatening what one cares about, and includes a wish to diminish the other in return 
                                                          
1 For some evidence of a positive correlation between arrogance, dominance (as trying to outdo others) and 
anger in the workplace see Johnson et al. (2010). 
2 Arrogant individuals want to be superior to other people. They are not as interested in having their 
superiority acknowledged by others, although they would welcome such acknowledgment as evidence that 
they are rcorrect in their evaluations of their qualities as impressive. 
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(Nussbaum, 2016), it is no surprise that superbia, which presupposes an hyper-vigilance to 
alleged thƌeats to oŶe͛s supeƌioƌitǇ, ofteŶ manifests itself through anger.  
Further, the account of superbia, which emerges by exploring its connections to 
anger, provides an illuminating lens through which to understand arrogant behaviours in 
debate. Arrogant speakers interrupt others, and react angrily when challenged. We can 
make sense of their anger, if we think that those who suffer from superbia arrogate for 
themselves a dispensation from the answerability commitment that governs the speech act 
of assertion. Arrogant individuals interpret any challenge as an affront because they think of 
it as a violation of their special entitlements. 
The paper consists of three sections. In the first I focus on anger as a negative 
emotion in response to a perceived wrong which includes a wish for a pay-back. In the 
second I argue that there is a kind of arrogance that is characterised by an inflated but 
fragile self-esteem.3 Individuals who suffer from it are very defensive; they attempt to 
protect their superiority by engaging in behaviour designed to diminish others. In the third 
section I describe the effects of superbia on debate. Speakers, who are arrogant in this way, 
behave as they do because they arrogate for themselves the privilege not to be answerable 
for their claims to their listeners. That is, arrogant individuals behave as if they did not need 
to justify their claims. That is why they experience any challenge as a personal insult. They 
react in anger by intimidating and humiliating other people. Audiences can also be arrogant. 
They manifest their arrogance by exhibiting a propensity to dismiss speakers or to 
mansplain to them their own views. 
 
 
1. On Anger 
 
                                                          
3 This insecurity about self-esteem is a cause of the self-deception at the root of arrogance. Those who suffer 
from superbia lay claim to privileges and special treatment as a way of securing the high rank they seek, whilst 
believing that their high rank entitles them to the privileges they claim. In short, they act so as to bring about 
that their higher status, whilst thinking that their actions are warranted by their pre-existing high status. 
Thanks to Scott Aikin for forcing me to be clearer on this point. 
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Aristotle in the Rhetoric defines anger as a ͞desiƌe, aĐĐoŵpaŶied ďǇ [ŵeŶtal aŶd phǇsiĐal] 
distress, for apparent retaliation because of an apparent slight that was directed, without 
justifiĐatioŶ, agaiŶst oŶeself oƌ those Ŷeaƌ to oŶe͟ (1378a 30-33, Aristotle, 2007, p. 116). In 
what follows I flesh out this definition before briefly defending a qualified version of 
Aƌistotle͛s aĐĐouŶt. FiŶallǇ, I aƌgue, contrary to Stocker and Hegeman (1996), that anger 
should not be thought as an especially narcissistic emotion or reactive attitude. 
Anger is a negative emotion directed at a person or persons for something that they 
are perceived to have done. This action is thought by the angry person to be intentional and 
to constitute a wrong. In particular, the act is a wrong because it is both unjust, or otherwise 
illegitimate, and harmful to a person͛s iŶteƌest iŶ goods ǁhiĐh he takes to ďe central to his 
self-conception. The belief or judgment that one has been wronged in a way that harms 
what is closest to the self is the basis for the desire, also constitutive of anger, to get even. 
So anger involves a desire for revenge, retaliation or pay-back. 
Aristotle focuses almost exclusively on one kind of anger provoking wrong, namely a 
slight or insult. This is an action which if intentional is designed to diminish its target, to 
lower him or her in status. This focus on slights is, as Nussbaum (2016) observes, too 
narrow. People feel angry in response to wrongs other than slights. For example, we may be 
angry when someone has wrongfully harmed a friend. It would seem a mistake to think of 
this wrong as a slight. Yet, as Nussbaum also notes, there appear to be people who treat all 
anger provoking wrongs as insults directed at the self. We can easily imagine someone 
ƌeaĐtiŶg aŶgƌilǇ to a ǁƌoŶgful aĐtioŶ that haƌŵs a fƌieŶd ǁhilst thiŶkiŶg: ͚Hoǁ daƌe Ǉou 
haƌŵ ŵǇ fƌieŶd!͛. The peƌsoŶ ǁhose anger is motivated by this thought is conceiving of the 
wrong as a personal insult. His concern is not for the wrong inflicted on the friend, but for 
the diminishing effect that the action has on him. In his view, by harming his friends the 
offender is implicitly treating him as someone who can be messed with. In other words, the 
offender is not showing him the respect that would befit a person of high status or rank. 
Nussbaum refers to the anger manifested by these self-centred individuals as ͞status 
anger͟ because it is exclusively focused on actions experienced as personal affronts. Status 
aŶgeƌ ǁould theŶ ďe a ǁish foƌ paǇďaĐk ďased oŶ the ďelief that the offeŶdeƌ͛s aĐtioŶs ǁeƌe 
intentional and illegitimate atteŵpts to loǁeƌ oŶe͛s soĐial status. Nussďauŵ͛s ideŶtifiĐatioŶ 
of this kind of anger with an obsessive concern for social status is in my view too quick. The 
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person who is angry because he perceives the harm inflicted on a friend as a personal 
affront is clearly extremely self-centred. He would also seem to value the wrong things, or at 
least value some things disproportionately compared to their true worth. For instance, he 
values having positional goods, such as being the boss or the winner, more than he cares for 
the well-being of his friends. Social status, however, is only one such positional good; but 
there are others. An arrogant person may value being the best at some activity without 
caring about whether his alleged excellence is widely acknowledged.  
There is some unclarity over how to tƌaŶslate Aƌistotle͛s defiŶitioŶ of aŶgeƌ ǁhiĐh 
may have motivated commentators to read his account of it as a desire for retaliation 
following a threat to social status.4 Be that as it may, because the payback is intended as 
revenge, it matters, as Aristotle observes (1380b 20-29, 2007, p. 123), that the target of the 
action perceives it as retribution for his initial alleged offense. However, an individual may 
ƌespoŶd aŶgƌilǇ to aŶ aĐtioŶ that is peƌĐeiǀed as ǁƌoŶgfullǇ thƌeateŶiŶg oŶe͛s ƌaŶkiŶg, 
wishing to put the opponent in his place, without also desiring that the put down is public so 
that the offender will also be lowered in otheƌs͛ eǇes. For example, an individual may think 
that a colleague is slighting him by showing insufficient recognition of his high level of 
achievement. This colleague may be a peer who is perceived as acting superior. One may 
respond angrily to these alleged put downs by responding in kind. It seems entirely possible 
that the angry and vengeful individual finds satisfaction in pointing out to the offending 
colleague some failures in her performance, knowing that this will hurt her. He may not 
particularly care that the whole office notices the put down. Of course, there might people 
to whom it matters that the humiliation is public; but this need not be so. In other cases the 
desire for payback is fully satisfied by the response in kind. If this is true, anger in response 
to an act that is perceived as lowering one in rank, need not be exclusively concerned with 
social status. 
When anger is driven by a desire to get even or do others down in response to 
actions whose effects have been some loss or diminution with regard to a positional good, it 
may prove effective. By lowering or diminishing the offender in return, it is possible to 
                                                          
4 The debate concerns whether the slight is apparent in the subjective sense of appearing to one that one has 
been slighted or in the objective sense of the slight being manifest to all. I follow Leighton (2002, p. 27) in 
setting this issue aside. 
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succeed in re-establishing oŶe͛s prior ƌaŶk. HeŶĐe, ƌetaliatioŶ to ƌestoƌe oŶe͛s shaƌe of a 
positional good is not irrational. For example, if a child is invested in being the student that 
always raises her hand first whenever the teacher asks a question, she may perceive a quick 
raising of hand by another student as a slight. She thinks of this action as designed to lower 
her rank. In response she feels that it is within her right to kick the other student under the 
table or to snigger if he gets the answer wrong. In the long term these behaviours may be 
effeĐtiǀe iŶ ŵakiŶg oŶe͛s Đlassŵates thiŶk twice before raising their hands again.5 Thus, this 
kind of anger can succeed in undoing the loss that motived it. In this regard it is unlike anger 
of a different kind since harming the person who assaulted us will not undo the assault. 
Aristotle perceptively observes that anger is an implicit acknowledgement of 
vulnerability to threats (Rhetoric 1379a 49- 1379b 2, Aristotle, 2007, p. 119). He claims that 
those who respond angrily to claims dismissive of their qualities are insecure about their 
excellence, since those who are genuinely self-confident will show indifference for the 
attempted insults. In my view this observation gets to the heart of the psychology of anger 
over ranking or status. This kiŶd of aŶgeƌ is a defeŶsiǀe ŵeĐhaŶisŵ to pƌoteĐt oŶe͛s oǁŶ 
self-esteem from alleged threats. In other words, the person who has a tendency to anger 
ƋuiĐklǇ is the peƌsoŶ ǁho ofteŶ peƌĐeiǀes otheƌs͛ aĐtioŶs as a thƌeat to the self. TheǇ 
perceive actions which are not threatening as threats. They also take these threats as 
ĐoŶsistiŶg iŶ failiŶg to aĐkŶoǁledge oŶe͛s alleged status oƌ oŶe͛s possessioŶ of positioŶal 
goods such as being the best student in the class. In sum, these individual perceive these 
behaviours as slights or insults because their self-esteem depends on thinking of themselves 
as superior to others in a number of domains.  
Note, however, a peƌsoŶ͛s self-esteem can be so dependent on rankings whilst 
thinking that the only opinion about raŶkiŶg that ŵatteƌs to oŶe is oŶe͛s oǁŶ. As a ŵatteƌ of 
fact, this attitude would seem most consonant with arrogance. Why would one care if other 
people, whom one thinks are inferior to oneself, fail to ƌeĐogŶise oŶe͛s supeƌioƌitǇ? The 
reason why an arrogant person responds angrily to put downs is because they threaten his 
ranking in his own eyes. Firstly, perceived put downs ƌaise the speĐtƌe that oŶe͛s oǁŶ 
estiŵate of oŶe͛s supeƌioƌ aďilities may be a mistake. It is this iŶseĐuƌitǇ iŶ oŶe͛s oǁŶ eǇes 
                                                          
5 Of course, the student who raises the hand quickly has not wronged anyone. Nevertheless, she may be 
perceived as having done so by her classmate. 
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that drives the angry response aiming to intimidate the opponent into silence so that he will 
Ŷot ŵake salieŶt agaiŶ the possiďilitǇ that oŶe͛s own self-assessment is erroneous. 
Secondly, put downs are at least in some domains actually effective in loweƌiŶg soŵeďodǇ͛s 
rank. For instance, one would not belong anymore to the category of people with whom 
others do not mess. The angry response might restore the previous state of affairs. 
I am now in a position to substantiate the claim I made at the start of this section 
that even self-centred anger is not always a manifestation of narcissism. There is no agreed 
definition of narcissism in the social psychological literature which would clearly demarcate 
it from arrogance and superbia. Rather, psychologists often think of narcissism as a kind of 
arrogant and defensive pride (McGregor et al., 2005). I suspect that the same conflation 
mars some philosophical accounts explaining status anger as a manifestation of narcissism. 
There are undoubtedly close ties between superbia and narcissism since they both involve 
self-ĐeŶtƌedŶess aŶd aŶ iŶflated seŶse of oŶe͛s oǁŶ speĐialŶess. But theƌe also iŵpoƌtaŶt 
differences between the two which tend to be ignored. Narcissism is a deep kind of vanity 
when one turns onto oneself the infatuated and admiring gaze that one seeks from other 
people. So unlike individuals driven by superbia who primarily want to be superior to other 
people, individuals who are vain and narcissistic want to be loved by them. Individuals who 
suffer from superbia would be delighted to strike fear in the hearts of others around them. 
In this regard, superbia and arrogance on the one hand, and vanity and narcissism on the 
other, are polar opposites. Although more would need to be said to substantiate these 
claims, nevertheless they receive some support from the folk conception of narcissism as a 
kind of self-infatuation which, being closely related to vanity, seeks to doǁŶ plaǇ oŶe͛s 
visible defects in order to be the object of admiration. 
If this is right, those who are vain and narcissistic do not seek payback; they do not 
wish to do others down.6 On the contrary since they wish to be admired, they may even 
flatter and charm other people so that to get their love in return. Both those who suffer 
from superbia and those who are vain and narcissistic seek elevation and self-enhancement. 
But they seek different kinds of self-enhancement and pursue them in different ways. 
Individuals who have superbia want to be superior to others; whilst those who are vain and 
                                                          
6 They may, out of envy, wish misfortune upon them. 
8 
 
narcissistic only care that others think that they are superior. Further, vain and narcissistic 
individuals because they want to be admired can only gain their superior status when others 
like them. Thus, although they may be envious and even spiteful; they are unlikely to seek 
pay back since doing so would be an obstacle to being admired. In this regard, those who 
suffer from superbia are different, since they do not seek to be loved, they have no scruples 
to do others down in order to triumph. To summarise, anger is a manifestation not of 
narcissism but of superbia. 
 
3 On Intellectual Arrogance 
 
Intellectual arrogance is generally regarded as a vice of superiority because arrogant people 
presume that they are better than other people. It might be tempting to conclude that 
arrogance consists in the belief that one is superior or more excellent than others. This 
ĐoŶĐlusioŶ, hoǁeǀeƌ, is a ŵistake. Belief iŶ oŶe͛s alleged superiority is not sufficient for 
arrogance. It is possible for a person to think of herself as better in some domain than 
others in her circle without being arrogant. This person may be self-confident but she would 
not act superior, or be dismissive of those around her (Tiberius & Walker, 1998). Even if this 
peƌsoŶ͛s ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ heƌ supeƌioƌ aďilities is ŵisplaĐed ďeĐause heƌ ďeliefs aďout heƌ 
capacities are false, it is perfectly possible that such a person has made an honest mistake. If 
so, she may not display the attitudes and dispositions characteristic of arrogance such as 
smugness, self-satisfaction, presumptuousness, aloofness, and a propensity to treat others 
with contempt and to dismiss their views without due consideration (Tanesini, 2016a, 
2016b). 
Contra Tiberius and Walker (1998) full ďelief iŶ oŶe͛s supeƌioƌitǇ is Ŷot eǀeŶ 
necessary for arrogance. It seems possible that a person may act in superior ways, and take 
great pains to make it manifest to all that she thinks she is better than they are, precisely as 
a way of building up her self-confidence against nagging doubts about her own superiority. 
If this is right, at least some arrogant individuals are very insecure about their self-worth. 
They appear to be full of themselves because they continually engage in the process of 
͞bigging͟ themselves up. But, the smugness and self-satisfaction of the arrogant individual is 
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a defeŶsiǀe ƌeaĐtioŶ to Đoǀeƌ up foƌ a deep seŶse that oŶe͛s self-esteem is fragile and under 
threat. 
These considerations suggest that arrogance, including intellectual arrogance, does 
not consist in ďeliefs aďout oŶe͛s alleged supeƌioƌitǇ, although it may be accompanied by 
them. Rather, arrogant individuals need to feel superior to other people in order to preserve 
a sense of self-worth. That is, their own self-esteem is predicated on feeling that they are 
better than others. Thus, theǇ ĐoŶstƌue otheƌs͛ aďilities aŶd aĐhieǀeŵeŶt as a thƌeat to theiƌ 
self-esteem. They react defensively to these alleged threats by trying to boost their self-
confidence. Arrogance, therefore, is a manifestation of what social psychologists have 
labelled defensive high self-esteem (Haddock & Gebauer, 2011). 
Individuals who have high self-esteem as explicitly measured through questionnaires 
appear to be very confident in their abilities. Some of these people, however, have low self-
esteem when this is measured indirectly. For example, these people dislike things which are 
associated with the self, such as their own name or its first letter. They may also associate 
the self with negative or unpleasant things. These associations can be measured in IATs 
(implicit association tests). These people whose self-esteem seems high in explicit measures 
and low in indirect ones are said to have defensive high self-esteem (Haddock & Gebauer, 
2011). They are very sensitive to threats; they are alert to respond to them and tend to 
misclassify some unthreatening situations as threats. Their apparent confidence, which is 
recorded in the explicit measures of self-esteem, is a defensive response that belies their 
deeper insecurities which are revealed when self-esteem is measured indirectly.7 
There is empirical evidence that individuals whose high self-esteem is defensive 
display all the behaviours usually associated with arrogance. For example, they have a 
propensity for self-enhancement (Bosson et al., 2003); they are prone to boasting (Olson et 
al., 2007); they react to threats in seemingly arrogant ways (McGregor et al., 2005); they 
suffer from heightened defensiveness (Haddock & Gebauer, 2011); they have higher levels 
of prejudice toward members of other ethnic groups (Jordan et al., 2005); they display 
higher levels of self-deception in general than those whose high self-esteem is congruent 
                                                          
7 There is an unresolved debate within social psychology whether these two kinds of measurement tap into 
the same construct or whether they track different psychological states. Here, I set this issue aside. 
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(Jordan et al., 2003); they have a tendency to overestimate the extent to which other 
people agree with their views (McGregor et al., 2005) and to react badly to negative 
feedback by derogating the views of out-group members (Jordan et al., 2005); finally, they 
are prone to anger (Schröder-Abé et al., 2007). 
It is not my contention that all forms of arrogance are indicative of defensive 
responses to insecurities about the worth of the self. Rather, my view is that there is a 
distinctive form of arrogance that displays these features. I call this brand of arrogance 
haughtiness or superbia because it is characterised by an inordinate desire to diminish or 
humiliate other people so that one is able to excel.8 Individuals who possess this vice are 
consumed by an overwhelming desire for positional goods such winning races or being the 
first to make a discovery. They crave to secure these achievements as a way of boosting 
their self-esteem and are prepared to diminish other people to achieve their aims. 
There are at least two reasons why people who suffer from superbia behave in these 
ways. Firstly, by humiliating and abasing others, they are likely to succeed in eroding these 
people͛s ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ theiƌ oǁŶ aďilities and thus lower their standard of achievement. In 
this way, individuals suffering from superbia can bring it about that they outperform others. 
Secondly, also by diminishing others, they succeed in quietening them, or at least portraying 
them as not being worth listening to. Either way they minimise the risk of situations 
emerging that may force those whose self-esteem depends on feeling superior to revise 
downward their own sense of self-importance. 
I have argued so far that superbia is the kind of arrogance which is manifested in a 
desire for superiority combined with a propensity to do other people down in order to 
excel. These tendencies are rooted in insecurity about the worth of the self. Since one has 
low self-esteem one tries to enhance it by feeling that one is better than others. But since 
oŶe͛s seŶse of self-worth is dependent on these favourable comparisons, it is also fragile 
ďeĐause otheƌs͛ suĐĐesses ǁould uŶƌaǀel it. HeŶĐe, oŶe eǆpeƌieŶĐes oŶe͛s self-esteem as 
especially vulnerable to threats and one adopts defensive attitudes to protect it. 
IŵpoƌtaŶtlǇ, oŶe also eǆpeƌieŶĐes otheƌs͛ aĐhieǀeŵeŶts as ďeiŶg thƌeats to oŶe͛s self-
esteem and thus acts to neutralise these threats by diminishing other people. Hence, one 
                                                          
8 This is DaŶte͛s ĐhaƌaĐteƌisatioŶ of supeƌďia iŶ his Divine Comedy (1994) at Purg., XVII vv 115-17. 
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does others down to protect one͛s self-esteeŵ, ďeĐause oŶe͛s oǁŶ seŶse of self-worth is 
dependent on feeling superior to other people. 
Individuals who are arrogant in these ways, because they need to feel superior to 
other people, also attempt to gain confidence in their superiority by claiming special 
entitlements (Roberts & Wood, 2007, p. 77). If they are granted these privileges, they can 
tell themselves that the special treatment is warranted by their excellence when compared 
to other members of the group. These thoughts then offer support for the feelings of 
superiority which are so crucial to their self-esteem. 
Further, arrogant expectations of entitlement to special and preferential treatment 
cause these individuals to perceive perfectly legitimate behaviour on the part of other 
people as insulting. They expected to be treated as VIPs, and thus experience common 
treatment as a slight. Because these individuals are protective of their self-esteem, which in 
their case can only be protected by feeling superior, they react to the perceived slights by 
attempting to do other people down in response. 
It is now clear why those who suffer from superbia are especially prone to anger. 
They experience quite innocent and common behaviour as an insult and a personal affront. 
These experiences are born out of their sense of entitlement. Whenever these individuals 
do not receive the preferential treatment which they arrogate for themselves, they feel that 
their rights (in the form of privileges) have been violated. Thus, they think that they have 
been wronged because they have been denied the respect which is due to them. For this 
reason, these individuals are prone to perceive a broad range of actions as insults directed 
at them. Further, they respond to experiences of slights by seeking to get even. This desire 
for revenge is the desire to others down which is characteristic of superbia. 
To summarise, we should expect some forms of arrogance to be manifested in a 
propensity to anger often and quickly. Since this kind of arrogance is underpinned by a need 
to protect a fragile self-esteem by feeling superior, individuals who suffer from this feature 
are likelǇ to ĐoŶstƌue a ďƌoad ƌaŶge of oĐĐasioŶs as thƌeats to oŶe͛s seŶse of self-worth. In 
particular, they interpret ordinary treatment as a slight because it violates their alleged 
privileges. Theferore, arrogant individuals are likely to experience an unusually broad range 
of situations as warranting an angry reaction. Moreover, because they are inclined to 
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attempt to establish their superiority, they are disposed to act on their perceptions and 
react angrily. Getting even in response to what they experience as slights is for them a 
perfect way to try to achieve their goal of feeling superior whilst thinking that they occupy 
the moral high ground. 
 
 
3. Superbia and Anger in Debate 
 
In this section I highlight some of the negative effects of superbia, and of the anger that 
accompanies it, on debating behaviour. My focus is on one privilege arrogated by those who 
suffer from this vice. This is their tendency to think that they do not need to offer 
justifications for their views and to think that they are better placed than speakers 
themselves to justifǇ the speakeƌs͛ oǁŶ ǀieǁs. 
Superbia in debate can take many forms. These include domineering conduct such as 
takiŶg up ŵoƌe thaŶ oŶe͛s alloĐated speakiŶg tiŵe, ƌudelǇ iŶteƌƌuptiŶg otheƌ people oƌ 
speaking over them. It comprises linguistic and paralinguistic behaviours intended to dismiss 
or belittle the views expressed by other participants. These range from eye rolling, 
expressions of feigned disbelief as well as verbal insults. Such conduct is disrespectful 
because it violates the norms governing debating behaviour.  
Speakers and listeners that engage in discussion and vigorous debate have 
obligations toward each other. These obligations have an ethical-epistemic character since 
they relate to what epistemic agents owe to each other when engaged in an epistemic 
practice such as debate. Whilst often people enter in discussions with the sole aim of 
winning and defeating their adversary, in many situations the proper aim of debate should 
be to clarify contrasting views, to test them against a number of possible challenges, to 
highlight what evidence exists in their support, and at least in some cases to resolve the 
disagreement in favour of the view that is more likely to be true and that satisfies other 
epistemic desiderata such as explanatory power. So understood, debate is part of enquiry 
whose purpose is the production and distribution of knowledge and responsibly held belief. 
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The norms governing debate facilitate the achievement of the proper aims of this 
practice. In this paper I focus primarily on norms that concern the conduct of individuals 
with regard to making assertions. In particular, I discuss some responsibilities that speakers 
have toward their addressees and that listeners have toward speakers. These are 
responsibilities that flow from the commitment undertaken by speakers to be answerable to 
their audience for their claims. 
When using assertions to tell something to an audience a speaker undertakes at 
least two commitments.9 She commits herself to having the right epistemic standing with 
regard to the content of her assertion. That is, she shoulders accountability for its 
correctness. She also commits to answering proper queries and challenges to her claims. 
That is, she takes herself to be answerable to others for supplying them with reasons to 
believe her assertions if they have well-founded reservations. I have elsewhere labelled 
these commitments as, respectively, the accountability and answerability commitment 
(Tanesini, 2016a). Here I restrict my discussion to the second. 
When making an assertion, a speaker, in addition to vouchsafing for its correctness, 
accepts the responsibility to answer challenges when these are legitimate. A speaker, that 
is, typically accepts an obligation to justify her assertions, when her addressee raises 
genuine concerns.10 A speaker is within her own right to treat some challenges as 
disingenuous. For example, there are contexts in which an intervention from a member of 
an audience feigning that he does not understand what the speaker is saying should not be 
taken as a genuine request for clarification.11 It is best read as an indirect way of insinuating 
that the speaker was insufficiently clear because her position is indefensible. In these 
circumstances the speaker has no obligation to justify and clarify his claim, because no 
proper challenge to it has been issued. 
Whilst speakers are usually answerable to their audiences and thus have 
responsibilities toward them to present reasons and evidence in support of their assertions, 
                                                          
9 There is a third commitment to sincerity which I bracket for the purposes of this paper. 
10 This obligation can be overridden by weightier responsibilities. 
11 This move is only effective when the questioner is widely thought as intellectually superior to the speaker. In 
these Đases otheƌ ŵeŵďeƌs of the audieŶĐe aƌe iŶǀited to iŶfeƌ fƌoŵ the ƋuestioŶeƌ͛s Đlaiŵ that he Đould Ŷot 
understand that the presentation was unclear, given their firm background belief that the questioner is 
smarter than the speaker. 
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there may be special cases where speakers are exempt from this responsibility because of 
their authority. For instance, the Pope as representative of Christ on earth is meant to have 
special epistemic authority when speaking ex-cathedra. We can interpret the doctrine of 
papal infallibility as stating that on these occasions, the Pope although accountable for the 
correctness of his pronouncements is not answerable for them to ordinary members of the 
church. In these circumstances, there would be no legitimate challenges to his views; thus, 
there are no queries he ought to answer, or reasons he must offer. The Pope would have 
the special epistemic privilege not to have to justify his position to other people in a debate. 
Personally, I am sceptical about papal authority; therefore, I do not believe that he has the 
privilege not to be challenged even when speaking ex-cathedra. Nevertheless, the example 
suffices to show that there could be aa authoritative kind of assertion that does not impose 
on speakers the requirement to be answerable for their claims. This kind assertion is akin to 
a verdict since it is intended as responsive to the facts without being open to challenges.12 
One of the characteristic behaviours of those who suffer from superbia is their angry 
reactions to any challenge when engaged in a discussion. They treat disagreements as 
personal insults. The account offered here offers an explanation for this otherwise 
inexplicable behaviour. Arrogant individuals claim for themselves the privilege not to be 
challenged. They think that they do not need to justify their views to others because they 
feel that their superiority bestows upon them the kind of authority that insulates them from 
queries. Since, as it goes without saying, the arrogation of this privilege is illegitimate the 
aƌƌogaŶt iŶdiǀidual͛s disŵissal of ĐƌitiĐisŵs ǀiolates the Ŷoƌŵs of deďate and is disrespectful 
to others. 
Arrogant individuals do not merely dismiss challenges by ignoring them. They often 
go further and positively attempt to intimidate and humiliate those who disagree with 
them. They seem to think that they are entitled to behave in these ways because their 
actions would be retribution for the violation of their alleged privilege not be questioned or 
disagreed with. Both intimidation and humiliation are effective strategies to defend the kind 
of self-confidence which is based on the need to feel superior. Intimidation and humiliation 
                                                          
12 See Tanesini (2016a) for further discussion of these points. 
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are also what we would expect, if these reactions are angry attempts to get even following a 
perceived slight. 
Intellectually arrogant individuals intimidate by shouting people down, and by 
engaging in other activities which will make their opponent fearful of voicing their 
challenges in future. Intimidation works to minimise the risk of further threats to self-
esteem since if others are rendered timid they are unlikely to speak up. Arrogant people 
also humiliate their opponents by engaging in behaviour that belittles them and their views. 
Humiliation succeeds by making others feel ashamed. It undermines their self-confidence 
while promoting deferential and servile behaviour.  
In short, those who are arrogant defend their illegitimate privilege not to be 
challenged in two ways which are effective in minimising the occurrence of future 
ĐhalleŶges. IŶtiŵidatioŶ suĐĐeeds ďǇ ĐƌeatiŶg the ĐoŶditioŶs iŶ ǁhiĐh oŶe͛s oppoŶeŶts ǁill 
self-silence or self-smother (Dotson, 2011). They choose silence out of fear to be subjected 
to the bullying and harassing behaviour characteristic of arrogant shouting and 
doŵiŶeeƌiŶg. HuŵiliatioŶ suĐĐeeds ďǇ ĐƌeatiŶg the ĐoŶditioŶs iŶ ǁhiĐh oŶe͛s oppoŶeŶts lose 
confidence in their own opinions (Tanesini, forthcoming). Having been the target of 
condescension and dismissal people can become deferential and servile in the hope of 
putting an end to the abasing treatment. 
Superbia affects the behaviour of addressees as well as that of speakers. Whilst, 
contra Anscombe (1979, p. 150), audiences are not ordinarily disrespectful if they do not 
believe what a speaker says, listeners are under an obligation to at least recognise that the 
speaker has made a contribution to the debate (Tanesini, 2016a).13 That is, listeners must 
acknowledge, for example, that the speaker has committed to justifying her claims if 
challenged. Hence, it would be disrespectful if addressees ignored this commitment and 
asked a third party whether one should believe the original assertion. In my view, an 
addressee is under no obligation to ask the speaker for a justification whenever he is 
doubtful or even sceptical about her claim since the addressee is within his right to change 
the topic of debate or end the conversation. He is not however entitled to ignore the 
                                                          
13 That said, theƌe aƌe Đases ǁheŶ Ŷot to ďelieǀed is aŶ iŶsult. Foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, if oŶe͛s asseƌtioŶ is iŶ ƌespoŶse to a 
query, one is entitled to expect that the questioner believes the response in the absence of independent 
evidence casting doubt over the truth of the answer. 
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commitment made by the speaker or dismiss what she said. By making an assertion a 
speaker has taken upon herself the burden to defend her claim and be blameworthy if it 
turns out to have been incorrect. The audience owes it to the speaker to acknowledge that 
she has willingly undertaken these special responsibilities. 
Arrogant audiences are often not willing to acknowledge that the speaker has 
acquired these obligations. They deny their acknowledgment to speakers, because to accept 
it is to ƌeĐogŶise that the speakeƌ͛s has a privileged status with regard to the asserted 
content. Defending it, in the given context, is primarily her responsibility. Arrogant 
individuals see even this behaviour as a challenge to their superiority. Hence, the prevalence 
of a phenomenon known as mansplaining. When it occurs, an addressee takes upon himself 
the responsibility to explain and defend to a speaker, the true meaning of her own claims. 
This ĐoŶdesĐeŶdiŶg attitude is a ǁaǇ of asseƌtiŶg oŶe͛s supeƌioƌitǇ ďǇ deŶǇiŶg that the 
speaker has any authority over her own claims, and thus acting in loco parentis on her 
behalf. It is this presumption that the speaker is unable to shoulder her responsibility 
toward her own claims, that makes mansplaining condescending and offensive rather than 
helpful. It is the faĐt that it is aŶ atteŵpt to diŵiŶish otheƌs so that oŶe ĐaŶ eǆĐel iŶ oŶe͛s 
own eyes that makes mansplaining an example of how an addressee may fail to give a 
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